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DOUBLE JEOPARDY-MUNICIPAL PROSECUTIONS
AS A BAR TO SUBSEQUENT STATE PROSECU-
TIONS FOR OFFENSES ARISING FROM
THE SAME CRIMINAL ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
One of the most commonly recognized civil liberties in this
country is the guarantee against double jeopardy. It is generally
understood that this guarantee prevents one from being tried twice
for the same crime. Although this is true, a closer look into dou-
ble jeopardy will reveal that stating the guarantee is much easier
than applying it.
The guarantee against double jeopardy is established by the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution1 and by the
constitutions of most of the states.2 Notwithstanding the ref-
erence to "jeopardy to life or limb," the Federal Constitution has
been interpreted to apply to crimes punishable by non-corporal
punishment and to apply to misdemeanors as well as felonies.8
Some states have interpreted similar language in their constitu-
tions as limiting double jeopardy to capital cases.4 In these
states the pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit, which
serve the same purpose as the prohibition against double jeop-
ardy, are available in non-capital cases.5  The United States Su-
preme Court has recently held the fifth amendment provisions ap-
plicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment Due
Process Clause.,
The three rules central to the double jeopardy prohibition
are that a defendant: (1) cannot be retired for the same offense
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V, "[N]or shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
2. E.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 10, "[N]o person shall, for the same of-
fense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
3. E.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873).
4. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Papy v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 368, 207
A.2d 814 (1965).
5. Id. Autrefois convict which means previously convicted and
autrofois acquit which means formerly acquitted were pleas at bar in
common law criminal trials. They served the same purpose as a plea of
double jeopardy.
6. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 323 (1969). The state interpreta-
tions limiting double jeopardy to capital cases are now questionable in
light of this decision.
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after acquittal; 7 (2) cannot be retried for the same offense after
conviction;8 and (3) cannot be punished more than once for the
same offense.9 These rules are based on the moral principles that
it is wrong to retry an "innocent" man, wrong to harass a person
with continual prosecutions, and wrong to punish a person more
than once for the same crime.1 Since the prohibition against
double jeopardy is recognized throughout the United States, these
three central rules could afford substantial protection to defend-
ants. However, before a defendant can reap the benefit of double
jeopardy's three central rules he must meet the requirements for
a successful plea of double jeopardy. The basic requirements
are that the offense charged at the second trial must be the same
offense with which he was charged at the first trial,1 1 or alterna-
tively, one of the offenses must be a lesser included offense of the
other,12 and the jurisdiction of the first court must be such that
jeopardy attached.' 3 The necessity of meeting these requirements
has diminished the beneficial effect of the prohibition against dou-
ble jeopardy by making it difficult to plead double jeopardy suc-
cessfully.
Although it is difficult for any defendant to meet the require-
ments for a successful plea of double jeopardy, meeting these re-
quirements is especially difficult for the defendant who is at-
tempting to plead double jeopardy based on a previous municipal
court trial. This Comment will analyze the requirements which
must be met and attempt to explain the circumstances under which
a municipal trial will bar a subsequent superior court trial based
on the same conduct.'
4
7. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 668 (1896). This rule ac-
complishes the same purpose as the plea of autrefois acquit.
8. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168 (1873). This rule accomplished
the same purpose as a plea of autrefois convict.
9. Id. at 173.
10. Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 266 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Twice in Jeopardy].
11. See notes 27-75 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 78-112 and accompanying text infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 113-132 infra. The question of when
jeopardy attaches is a problem in its own right and beyond the scope of
this article. For the purposes of this discussion the question of when
jeopardy attaches will be limited to how the jurisdiction of the court
affects jeopardy.
14. Although the term "municipal trial" is used, for the purposes of
this paper the term includes any criminal prosecution by any court sub-
ordinate to the first level of statewide courts, including such proceedings
as magistrate's court, traffic courts, justice of the peace hearings and
other summary proceedings.
Background-Waller v. Florida and its Application
The difficulties faced by a defendant attempting to plead his
municipal trial as a bar to his present trial are exemplified in
Waller v. Florida5 and its subsequent application as authority for
a defense of double jeopardy.10 Waller was one of a number of per-
sons who removed a mural from the wall of the city hall in St.
Petersburg, Florida. The mural was carried through the streets
of St. Petersburg until police confronted the group and recovered
the damaged mural. Waller was charged in St. Petersburg Mu-
nicipal Court with destruction of city property and disorderly
breach of the peace. He was found guilty of both crimes. La-
ter an information was filed against Waller by the State of Florida,
charging him with grand larceny. Claiming double jeopardy, Wal-
ler moved for a writ of prohibition, but it was denied and he was
found guilty of the state charge in the circuit court of Pinellas
County. Waller again appealed claiming double jeopardy, but the
Florida courts rejected his appeal, relying on the existence of
dual sovereignty between the municipal and state governments.17
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, vacated the
judgment and remanded, holding that under the Florida Constitu-
tion municipalities were subordinate units of the same sovereign,
the state, and thus dual sovereignty did not apply.' 8 Since the
Florida courts had proceeded on the assumption that the offenses
were the same, the second trial constituted double jeopardy. In
summary the Court stated:
We decided only that the Florida courts were in error to
the extent of holding that-"even if a person has been
tried in a municipal court for the identical offense with
which he is charged in a state court, this would not be a
bar to the prosecution of such person in the proper state
court."' 9
Initially it appears that the only effect of Waller on double
jeopardy is the abolition of dual sovereignty within the states rec-
ognizing the doctrine.20  However, a second look reveals another
15. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
16. See, note 20 infra.
17. Dual sovereignty is an exception to the general prohibition against
two trials for the same offense. If the same offense violates the laws of
separate sovereigns it can be punished by each. Thus under our federal
system wherein the United States is a sovereign and the several states are
also sovereigns, a defendant can be tried once by the state and once by
the federal government, for the same offense. See Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). Prior
to Waller many states also held dual sovereignty applicable within a state
so that city and state courts could each try the accused for the same
offense.
18. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 392, 393 (1970).
19. Id. at 395.
20. For a list of the states recognizing the dual sovereignty doctrine
prior to Waller, see 397 U.S. at 891, n.3.
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effect of Waller on double jeopardy: if all courts within a state
are considered arms of the same sovereign, a prosecution in a mu-
nicipal court is a bar to a later prosecution for the same offense
in a state court. It is this latter point which defendants have
emphasized by using Waller v. Florida as authority for their dou-
ble jeopardy pleas.
Waller has been cited in over fifty cases since April 1970.21
In most of the cases citing Waller the first trial was in a mu-
nicipal court.22 In the vast majority of the cases, Waller was cited
in the defendant's brief as support for his contention that the
first (municipal court) trial barred the second trial. The difficulty
of establishing double jeopardy by a former municipal trial is il-
lustrated by the fact that in practically every instance where
Waller has been cited it has been held inapplicable. Courts have
either strictly confined Waller to the question of dual sover-
eignty23 or found that the defendant had failed to meet one or all
of the requirements necessary to show double jeopardy.24 Only
where there is an assumption, as in Waller, that the offenses were
the same, have the courts recognized the applicability of Waller.25
It is important to note that the failure of Waller as authority for
a plea of double jeopardy is not the result of misinterpretation of
the Supreme Court's opinion or hostility by lower courts. Waller's
failure is a result of its use in cases where the general require-
ments for a successful double jeopardy plea have not been met.
I. IDENTITY OF OFFENSES
Since the Constitution expressly prohibits double jeopardy for
the "same offense, '26 the primary requirement to be met when
seeking to prove double jeopardy is that the offenses are the
same. At first blush this seems to be an elementary problem;
an offense is either the same as another or it is not. The problem
exists because "same offense" is not used in the strict sense, but
rather as a word of art whose meaning is shaped by policy.27 The
21. See, e.g., Robinson v. Neil, 320 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Tenn. 1970);
State v. Conrad, 243 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1971); Barrett v. State, 478 P.2d 1017
(Okla. Crim. 1970).
22. See, e.g., State v. Conrad, 243 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1971); Barrett v.
State, 478 P.2d 1017 (Okla. Crim. 1970).
23. See, e.g., State v. Conrad, 243 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1971).
24. See, e.g., Barrett v. State, 123 Ga. App. 210, 180 S.E.2d 271
(1971); State v. Hill, 254 S.C. 321, 175 S.E.2d 227 (1970).
25. See, e.g., Barrett v. State, 478 P.2d 1017 (Okla. Crim. 1970);
People v. Allison, 46 Ill. 2d 147, 263 N.E.2d 81 (1970).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See note 1 supra.
27. Twice in Jeopardy at 275.
problem is further complicated by what one commentator calls
"the act-offense dichotomy." 8  Basically, the act-offense dichot-
omy means that a single act or course of conduct may or may
not be a single offense, depending on how many statutory provi-
sions it violates and how it compares with the test for identity of
offenses. Before the defendant can successfully plead double jeop-
ardy, he must determine whether the act or acts which gave rise
to his municipal prosecution constitute the same offense for which
he is being prosecuted in the state court. To determine whether
the offenses are the same he will have to use his jurisdiction's
test of identity. Three tests have been used in making this de-
termination: (1) the same evidence test; (2) the same transac-
tion test and; (3) the interest to protect test.
A. The Same Evidence Test
The oldest and most popular test for determining the identity
of offenses is the "same evidence test." This test was first applied
in Rex v. Vandercomb and Abbott29 and was designed to counter-
act an absurdity which resulted from the common law rules of
pleading. At common law, if the indictment charged one offense
but the proof showed another offense, this amounted to a varia-
tion between the pleadings and the proof and an acquittal fol-
lowed. In Vandercomb, the defendant was indicted for breaking
and entering and larceny of goods, but the proof showed there
was no larceny so an acquittal was reqiired. A second indictment
followed charging only breaking and entering with intent to steal,
thereby obviating proof of larceny. In order to prevent what
would have amounted to a "technieal acquittal," the court held
that a former acquittal would not bar a second indictment,
[U] nless the first indictment were such as the prisoner
might have been convicted upon [it] by proof of facts con-
tained in the second indictment .... 30
To avoid the consequence of the pleading rules, the court estab-
lished an identity test which would allow the prosecutor to bring
a second indictment if it required different proof.
The same evidence test was adopted in this country in Morey
v. Commonwealth." In this case, in order to allow the defendant's
trial for adultery after a previous conviction for lewd and lascivi-
ous cohabitation, the court modified the rule and said:
A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to
a subsequent conviction . . . upon another, unless the evi-
dence required to support a conviction upon one of them
28. Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE
L.J. 513 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Kirchheimer].
29. 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (Crown. 1796).
30. Id. at 461.
31. 108 Mass. 433 (1871).
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would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon
the other.
3 2
Morey changed the English test in two ways. First, it expanded
the test to apply to convictions as well as to acquittals even though
the original test was only necessary in the case of an acquittal. 3
Secondly, the identity of the offenses was made to rest on the evi-
dence necessary to prove either offense rather than solely on the
evidence necessary to prove the second offense.
Using Vandercomb and Morey as guides, courts began to adopt
the same evidence test and continued to modify it, creating such
variations as the "backward test, ''34 the "distinct element test,"'a
and the "identity test."36 While these tests vary slightly in effect
and operation, they all share the basic premise that the identity
of offenses depends upon the evidence necessary to prove each of-
fense.3 1 This premise presents the primary difficulty to defend-
ants attempting to prove that their municipal trials were for the
same offense as the later state prosecution.
When the same evidence test was born its application was
fairly simple and its results generally just, since offenses were
few and distinct. For example, when our Federal Constitution
was adopted there were only 169 common law felonies38 and only
a proportionate number of evidentiary variations. Today the sit-
uation is vastly different, with must states having an extensive
and detailed penal code 9 which has produced a "proliferation of
offenses capable of commission . . . at one time. ' 40 Although
most of the felonies and misdemeanors in modern penal codes re-
tain some similarity to common law crimes, the offenses which
32. Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
33. Vandercomb's test was only applied in the case of an acquittal
because in case of a conviction the prosecutor did not need a second shot-
felonies were then punishable by death.
34. So named because it is the converse of the test in Vandercomb,
it provides that two offenses are not the same unless the defendant could
have been convicted of the second offense on evidence required at the
first trial. See, e.g., State v. Brownrigg, 87 Me. 500, 33 A. 11 (1895).
35. "[T]he test to . . , determine whether there are two offenses or
only one is whether each . . . requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not." Blackburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
36. Offenses are not the same unless the same in "law and fact."
See, e.g., Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
37. For a good general discussion of the various same evidence tests
see Twice in Jeopardy at 269-77.
38. 2 J. STEPHENS, CRmINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 219 (1883).
39. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE (West 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAw (Mc-
Kinney 1944); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 (1963).
40. Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 306 (Alaska 1970).
most often constitute the grounds for a municipal court trial are
strictly creatures of legislative invention, and they are quite spe-
cific. Statutes creating summary offenses usually prohibit very
specific conduct and require special proof not required for most
common law crimes. The result of applying the same evidence
test to criminal offenses delineated with such specificity is this:
with a slight variation in proof the prosecutor can create two of-
fenses from one act by showing violation of two different stat-
utes. For example, in Iowa in 1928 it was a summary offense to
transport alcoholic beverages without proper labeling 41 and it was
also illegal to transport alocoholic beverages within the state.42
After the defendant had been convicted of the former offense,
the state sought conviction on the latter for the same act of trans-
portation. Under the same evidence test these were not the same
offense since they required different proof. The court, seeing the
inequity of the situation, had to exercise some close reasoning to
hold that the second prosecution was barred because the first trial
had been for a lesser included offense (but nevertheless a "dif-
ferent" offense). 43 Other defendants have not been as fortunate.
44
Proving the identity of offenses under the same evidence test
is especially difficult for the defendant attempting to show his mu-
nicipal trial was for the same offense with which he is later
charged. Because summary offenses involve specific conduct, such
as violations of the motor vehicle code, the evidence needed to
prove these offenses will rarely be the same as the evidence needed
to prove any other offense. Generally, in jurisdictions using the
same evidence test, a summary offense is found to be the "same"
as an indictable offense only if the offenses have exactly the
same name,45 or if the court feels that the only difference is the
name.46 The same evidence test has served to narrow the area
in which double jeopardy is useful, and has come under heavy at-
tack from commentators 47 and judges.48  One commentator has
suggested that the same evidence test may "practically [render]
void the constitutional inhibition."4 9  Along with this torrent of
criticism have come suggestions for new tests to determine the
identity of offenses.
41. IowA CODE § 125.16 (1924).
42. IOWA CODE § 125.27 (1927).
43. State v. Purdin, 206 Iowa 1058, 221 N.W. 562 (1928).
44. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); DuBois v. Hocker,
432 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1970).
45. People v. Allison, 46 Ill. 2d 147, 263 N.E.2d 81 (1970).
46. Barrett v. State, 478 P.2d 1017 (Okla. Crim. 1970).
47. Kirchheimer at 513; Twice in Jeopardy at 266.
48. See, e.g., Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302 (Alaska 1970); Common-
wealth v. Brown, 216 Pa. Super. 81, 260 A.2d 476 (1969) (dissenting
opinion).
49. 1 BisHOP, CRnwuNAu LAw, § 1048 (9th ed. 1928).
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B. The Same Transaction Test
One of the tests proposed as a replacement for the same evi-
dence test is the "same transaction test." This test has been ac-
cepted by a small minority of states,50 receiving its primary impe-
tus from the sponsorship of Mr. Justice Brennan.5 1 Under the
same transaction test, all charges growing out of a single criminal
"act, occurrence, episode, or transaction" are, for double jeopardy
purposes, considered the same offense.52 To sustain this view the
proponents of the same transaction test point to Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for joinder of
charges similar in nature or arising from the same transaction.
The test provides that failure to join all these "related" offenses
at one trial will result in a bar to a subsequent trial for the of-
fenses omitted.
Although the same transaction test has been adopted by some
jurisdictions,5" it has not been adopted in its pure form. Adoption
of the test in its purest form would indeed be a great benefit to
defendants-so great, in fact, that it has been criticized as a de-
fendant's rule.54 Practical considerations reveal, however, that
the pure form of the test would frustrate justice, and numerous
modifications have developed. These modifications coupled with
the inherent problem of determining what is "one transaction"
have served to emasculate the test.
The utility of the same transaction test for the defendant will
depend to a great extent on how his jurisdiction defines "same
transaction." A test which determines that offenses are the same
if they arise from the same transaction is just as subject to abuse
as a test which determines that offenses are the same if the evi-
dence is the same. Just as different offenses can be established by
slight variations in the evidence, different offenses can be estab-
lished by different determinations of what is the same transaction.
Since compulsory joinder only applies to offenses within the same
transaction, the court's determination of what is one transaction
50. Jones v. State, 19 Ala. App. 600, 99 So. 770 (1924); Grumley v.
Atlanta, 68 Ga. App. 69, 22 S.E.2d 181 (1942); State v. Greely, 30 N.J.
Super. 180, 103 A.2d 639 (1954); Worley v. State, 420 Okla. Crim. 240, 275
P. 399 (1929). New Jersey and Oklahoma appear to apply the same evi-
dence and same transaction tests interchangeably.
51. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970) (concurring
opinion); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 395 (1970) (concurring opinion).
52. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Brennan).
53. See note 50 supra.
54. Kirchheimer at 534.
is fundamental to the application of the test. It is possible for the
courts to divide one criminal "frolic" into as many or as few
"transactions" as they desire,5 5 and seldom will courts agree on
what is the same transaction. In Virginia, presenting a forged
check and accepting the money are two criminal acts,56 whereas
in California they would constitute one criminal act.T
In addition, the requirement of compulsory joinder of offenses
within the same transaction has been modified to prevent excessive
burdens from being placed on the court and the jury. If the
joinder would make the case too confusing for the jury, or if the
evidence necessary to prove the joined offenses is so unrelated as
to require the preparation of a "double case" by the prosecutor, the
offenses can be tried separately.58 The weakening effect of these
two exceptions on the same transaction test is apparent. It is dif-
ficult to visualize a concrete standard for determining when a case
is too confusing for the jury. Furthermore, if the offenses can
be tried separately because the evidence is unrelated, the court is
again applying some version of the same evidence test. A double
jeopardy plea under the same transaction test is based on compul-
sory joinder and the bar to prosecution for offenses not joined.
If compulsory joinder can be circumvented by a court's subjec-
tive determination of when a case is too confusing for the jury or
when a case is a "double case," the chances of proving double
jeopardy are greatly diminished.
Although these two means of circumventing compulsory join-
der lessen the utility of the same transaction test for a defendant
pleading any prior prosecutions as a bar to his later trial, an ad-
ditional exception makes the same transaction test practically
useless to the defendant relying on a prior municipal prosecution.
Under this exception, the failure to join all the crimes at one trial
will not bar a later prosecution if the court hearing the first
charge did not have jurisdiction over all the charges.59 As will be
seen later, courts hearing summary offenses usually lack jurisdic-
tion over more serious crimes.60 The lack of jurisdiction will
prevent the requirement of compulsory joinder from applying to
municipal offenses and will allow another trial for offenses arising
from the same transaction. Therefore, the same transaction test
does very little to protect the defendant in municipal prosecutions
from the harassment of subsequent state prosecutions for offenses
arising from the same transaction.
55. Twice in Jeopardy at 276.
56. See, Bullach v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 867, 140 S.E.2d 821 (1965).
57. See, People v. Keller, 212 Cal. App. 2d 153, 27 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1963).
58. Twice in Jeopardy at 293-94.
59. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453 n.6 (concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Brennan).
60. See text accompanying note 114 infra.
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C. The Interest-to-Protect Test
Realizing the inequities of the same evidence test and the
weakness of the same transaction test, several judges have pro-
posed a new test based on the objectives of the statute which has
been violated. This test was first proposed by Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge in District of Columbia v. Buckley.6 1 Mr. Justice Rutledge
felt that the court should go beyond determining the difference
between offenses via the same evidence test, and should consider
whether the difference was sufficient to warrant overcoming the
fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.6 2 This view
has been criticized as leaving unanswered the question of what
elements make the difference between offenses sufficient or insuf-
ficient. 3 Later refinement of the "Rutledge Doctrine" has at-
tempted to define what is a sufficient difference.
The Supreme Court of Alaska has adopted the "Rutledge Doc-
trine" with modifications and has produced the "interest-to-pro-
tect test. '64 By this test the statutory offenses are compared to
see to what degree they differ or are similar. If they are the same,
prosecution cannot be had on both. If they differ, these differ-
ences are weighed in light of the basic interest the statutes seek
to protect or the conduct they seek to discourage. If the statutes
seek to protect substantially the same interest or to prohibit
substantially the same conduct, there is not a "sufficient" differ-
ence between the statutes or offenses to warrant overcoming the
guarantee against double jeopardy. Thus a statute prohibiting
robbery and a statute prohibiting robbery using a firearm would
protect "substantially" the same interest and the difference be-
tween the offense would not be sufficient to warrant two trials.6 5
Although the interest-to-protect test was proposed as a means
of preventing multiple punishment, it is equally applicable to the
prevention of successive prosecutions which lead to multiple pun-
ishments. 66 This test is naturally very attractive to a defendant
who is pleading a summary conviction as a bar to his present
prosecution. He does not have to contend with the hopeless task
of trying to show that the same evidence is required to prove
both offenses, nor is he left helpless by exceptions to the same
61. 128 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (concurring opinion).
62. Id. at 21.
63. Kirchheimer at 532.
64. Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302 (Alaska 1970).
65. Id. at 312.
66. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 216 Pa. Super. 81, 260 A.2d
476 (1969) (dissenting opinion of Judge Hoffman).
transaction test. If the defendant can convince the court that
the municipal and state laws seek to protect the same interest, he
has established double jeopardy and the second prosecution will
be barred.
Attractive as the interest-to-protect test initially appears, it
has several weaknesses. First, it suffers from vagueness. Before
a second trial will be allowed it must be determined whether the
two offenses involved are "sufficiently" different to warrant over-
coming the fifth amendment guarantee. Whether the difference is
"sufficient" is determined by comparing the interests sought to be
protected to see if they are "substantially" the same or different.
Thus the application of the interest-to-protect test will vary with
each court's determination of what is "substantial" enough to be
"sufficient." Since courts rarely agree on the meaning of such
subjective standards, a defendant can never be certain that his
case will fall within the court's definition of these words.67 Sec-
ondly, the concept of "interest" is subject to being defined with
varying degrees of specificity. If a court takes a broad view of "in-
terest," the test can cover many related offenses, but if "inter-
est" is given a narrow scope the interest-to-protect test will sup-
ply no change from the same evidence test. For example, if the
defendant has robbed a bank and used a gun to do so he has vio-
lated two statutes, but has he harmed two interests? If the state
interest is to protect banks from robbery, then there is one offense.
If, however, the state has an interest in protecting banks from
robbery and in protecting robbery victims in general from the
great likelihood of harm inherent in armed robberies, then there
are two interests.68 Likewise, driving on the wrong side of the
road and driving while intoxicated could represent different in-
terests which the statutes were designed to protect.69
The proponents of the interest-to-protect test claim that the
vagueness inherent in the test is no greater than in other legal
standards and that intelligent application will make the test fair
and effective.70 Although there is no reason to doubt the truth
of this assertion, the success of the defendant's double jeopardy
plea will depend on the court's determination that each offense
threatened "substantially" the same interest. It is not very diffi-
cult to see that the specific nature of summary offenses makes it
very easy to find separate interests. The defendant who attempts
67. The Alaska Supreme Court in anticipation of this criticism, sought
to defend itself by stating that determining what is "substantial" is no
more imprecise than applying existing standards, such as "fundamental
fairness" or "reasonable." Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 313 (Alaska
1970). This does not seem to be a very satisfactory answer.
68. See, e.g., Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302 (Alaska 1970).
69. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
70. See note 67 supra.
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to show that the offense for which he was tried in municipal court
endangered the same interest as the offense with which he is later
charged will probably be unsuccessful. Courts often view sum-
mary offenses as unrelated to greater crimes 71 and it is doubtful
that they would feel unrelated crimes offend the same interest.
The same evidence test, the same transaction test and the in-
terest-to-protect test are the three means for determining the iden-
tity of offenses. Since proving that he is being prosecuted for the
"same" offense is the primary requirement which the defendant,
seeking the protection of the double jeopardy clause must meet, he
must determine which of the three tests is used in his jurisdic-
tion and apply it to his case. The results will usually be quite
discouraging. In the majority of the jurisdictions the same evi-
dence test will place upon the defendant the onerous task of show-
ing that the evidence used at the later trial will be the same as
that used in his previous municipal prosecution. 72 In other juris-
dictions the defendant will encounter the initially attractive
same transaction test only to find that the jurisdictional exception
gives this test limited applicability when the first trial was in
municipal court.73 Finally, the defendant may be faced with the
interest-to-protect test which is probably too vague to be relied
upon, especially when the first offense was a summary offense.
74
A review of the three identity tests leads to the conclusion that
the longevity of the same evidence test is perhaps due more to
the lack of a workable substitute than to its quality. As for the
defendant basing his double jeopardy plea on a prior municipal
court trial, the probability of proving the offenses are the "same"
is very limited.
II. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
Although a defendant may have little chance of proving that
he is being prosecuted twice for the "same" offense, a plea of dou-
ble jeopardy may still succeed if he can establish that his previous
municipal trial was for a lesser included offense of the later
charged offense. As judges realized that strict application of the
identity tests severely limited the guarantee against double jeop-
ardy, courts developed an exception for lesser included offenses,
71. See, e.g., State v. Curry, 41 N.J. 531, 197 A.2d 678 (1964); Com-
monwealth v. Sullivan, 77 York Leg. Rec. 160 (Pa. C.P. 1963).
72. See notes 38-49 and accompanying text supra.
73. See notes 50-60 and accompanying text supra.
74. See notes 61-70 and accompanying text supra.
Most jurisdictions hold that prosecution for a lesser included
offense will bar a subsequent prosecution for a higher crime em-
bracing that lesser offense.75 Consequently, the defendant has a
second chance. If he cannot show that he has already been tried
for the same offense, he may be able to show that he has been
tried for a lesser included offense. Attempting to establish that
a minor offense is a lesser part of a greater offense, however, can
be as difficult and as frustrating as trying to establish the iden-
tity of offenses. Like the tests for determining identity of offenses,
the tests for determining what constitutes a lesser included offense
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but all share the common
characteristic of "doctrinal rigidity.
'76
One of the most widely used tests for determining what is a
lesser included offense holds that a lesser offense is not a lesser
included offense unless the greater offense cannot be committed
without committing the lesser. 77 Under this test, offenses such as
larceny and assault are always lesser included offenses of rob-
bery,78 since the commission of robbery always involves the com-
mission of these lesser offenses. This test is definite and easily
applied but leaves many offenses untouched. For example, if the
commission of a crime necessarily involves the commission of one
of two lesser offenses, but either will suffice, then neither is a
lesser included offense. The greater offense can be committed
without committing one of the offenses. An offense such as in-
voluntary manslaughter can be committed by doing a lawful act
negligently and causing another's death 79 or by doing an unlawful
act not amounting to a felony.80 Either of these acts is usually an
offense in itself, but neither would be a lesser included offense of
involuntary manslaughter. This is especially important to one
convicted of a summary offense since these lesser offenses are of-
ten those tried in municipal courts.
Another test which enjoys wide acceptance is the "elements
test." Under this test all the elements of a lesser offense plus
other elements must be within a greater offense in order for the
minor offense to be a lesser included offense.8' Thus fornication
75. See, e.g., State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 N.W. 473 (1912);
State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951); Commonwealth v. Thatcher,
364 Pa. 326, 71 A.2d 796 (1950).
76. Kirchheimer at 530. The author of this article feels that all
these tests are arbitrary and rigid with no consideration for the logical
relationship of one offense to another.
77. United States v. Minker, 197 F. Supp. 295, 299 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
Commonwealth v. Heston, 292 Pa. 501, 141 A. 289 (1928).
78. See, Commonwealth v. Anagustov, 82 Pa. Super. 156 (1923).
79. See, Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 77 York 160 (Pa. 1963) (reck-
less driving).
80. See, Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 97 A.2d 343 (1953)
(assault and battery).
81. See, e.g., State v. Hreno, 162 Ohio St. 193, 122 N.E.2d 681 (1954).
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is a lesser included offense of rape,82 since the element of illicit
intercourse is present in both, but additional elements are needed
to prove rape. Since all the elements of the lesser offense must be
within the greater, aggravated assault and battery is not a lesser
included offense of involuntary manslaughter, but simple assault
and battery is a lesser included offense of both. 3 This results be-
cause, malice, one of the elements of aggravated assault and bat-
tery is not an element of involuntary manslaughter, 4 whereas all
the elements of simple assualt and battery are encompassed by
both aggravated assault and battery and involuntary manslaugh-
ter. Under the elements test, the defendant is faced with the task
of proving that all the elements of the summary offense are in-
cluded in the greater offense. Since the elements of an offense
depend upon the definition of that crime, the defendant's fate
is controlled by definitions rather than the logical relationship
of the summary offense to the greater crime. As we have seen,
summary offenses are creatures of legislative creation and are very
specific. The chances that all the elements will fit within the def-
inition of a greater crime are remote.
If a defendant could have committed the greater crime with-
out committting the summary offense,8 5 or if all the elements
of the summary offense are not within the definition of the greater
crime, 86 his first trial was not for a lesser included offense and
will not bar the present trial. Once again the accused has a heavy
burden to bear and a narrow path to follow. The rule that prose-
cution for a lesser included offense bars prosecution for the greater
offense has had limited application because it is so difficult to
fit a summary offense within the rigid and arbitrary definitions of
lesser included offenses. The rule has been criticized as not be-
ing an effective escape from the problem of identity of offenses.
8 7
The narrowness of its scope is readily apparent when one realizes
that violations of sections of motor vehicle codes designed to deter
vehicular manslaughter are not lesser included offenses of man-
slaughter.8
2. Commonwealth v. Mass, 173 Pa. Super. 367, 98 A.2d 372 (1953).
83. People v. Higgins, 86 Ill. App. 2d 202, 229 N.E.2d 161 (1967).
84. Id.
85. DuBois v. Hacher, 432 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v.
Anagustov, 82 Pa. Super. 156 (1923).
86. E.g., People v. Higgins, 86 Ill. App. 2d 202, 229 N.E.2d 161 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 97 A.2d 343 (1953).
87. Kirchheimer at 529.
88. Id. at 531.
Common Law Rule
An additional obstacle to showing that a summary offense is a
lesser included offense of a greater crime is the common law rule,
which provides that a misdemeanor cannot be tried on the same
indictment with a felony and a conviction of a misdemeanor can-
not be had on a felony indictment. 89 Since the accused can be con-
victed of a lesser included offense on an indictment for a greater
crime,90 by use of reverse reasoning, the courts have held that
the common law rule prohibits a misdemeanor from being the
same offense as or a lesser included offense of a felony.9 1 Since
under the common law rule, a defendant cannot be convicted of
a misdemeanor on the trial for a felony, a misdemeanor can never
be a lesser included offense of a felony.
The common law rule was originally designed to protect the
defendant's rights. At common law a person charged with a mis-
demeanor was afforded greater rights than one charged with a
felony. The right to full defense by counsel, the right to see a
copy of the indictment, and the right to a special jury were all
granted for misdemeanors but denied for felonies.92 To allow
the prosecutor to join a misdemeanor on an indictment for a felony
would deprive the defendant of his rights. The belief that joinder
would injure the accused remained the central concern of the
courts even after defendants had been granted the same rights in
both types of trial.93 Courts have constantly referred to the unfair
burden of defending against both a misdemeanor and a felony in
the same trial because of the impression of habitual criminality
created with the jury, and the possibility that one of the offenses
might influence the verdict on the other.94  As the foundations
for the common law rule began to decay, the rule was modified to
allow felonies and misdemeanors to be joined unless the offenses
charged were repugnant in their nature and legal incidents or un-
less the joinder deprived the defendant of some legal advantage.95
As modern procedural changes reduced the danger of denial of le-
gal advantages through joinder of felonies and misdemeanors, the
common law rule became increasingly insignificant. Most states
have abolished the rule 96 and England had abolished it by stat-
89. 1 J. CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW 255 (1819).
90. Commonwealth v. Anagustov, 82 Pa. Super. 156 (1923).
91. See, e.g., Hilands v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 372, 6 A. 267 (1886).
92. Hunter v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. 503, 505 (1873).
93. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Adams, 2 Pa. Super. 46 (1896);
Perue v. State, 43 Wyo. 322, 2 P.2d 1072 (1931).
94. E.g., Perue v. State, 43 Wyo. 322, 2 P.2d 1072 (1931).
95. Commonwealth v. Eberhardt, 164 Pa. Super. 591, 598, 67 A.2d
613, 617 (1949).
96. See, e.g., Hunter v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. 503 (1873); Ten-
penny v. State, 151 Tenn. 669, 270 S.W. 989 (1925).
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ute97 while it was still being strictly adhered to in this country.
98
However, the common law rule still exists in full force in some
states,9 9 where it makes it impossible to plead a municipal prose-
cution as a bar to a felony indictment. Since municipal courts
have jurisdiction only over summary offenses and misdemeanors,
a municipal court trial will never be for a lesser included offense
of a felony. Even the states which have abolished the common law
rule in respect to some crimes have kept it in force with respect
to other crimes. For example, in Pennsylvania the common law
rule still applies to homicide cases. 100 These jurisdictions seem to
take the view that joinder is permissible unless the offenses are
repugnant in their nature and legal incidents. 10 1 Since the homi-
cide "family" runs from first degree murder to involuntary man-
slaughter and from there down to assault and battery, the ex-
tremes in culpability and punishment make the joinder repug-
nant.10 2 Thus, neither involuntary manslaughter,'0 3 nor any of
the lesser parts of involuntary manslaughter such as assault and
battery are lesser included offenses of murder. In jurisdictions
retaining the common law rule with respect to homicide, munic-
ipal trials for misdemeanors related to homicide will not bar a
trial for a felony form of homicide. The continued application of
the common law rule to homicides is justified as being necessary
to prevent felons from escaping with a conviction for a misde-
neanor on a felony indictment. 0 4 The courts have also expressed
the fear that the joinder of homicide-related misdemeanors with
felony homicide would overly complicate the instructions to the
jury and tend to cause confusion. 10 5 Generally, the continued
existence of the common law rule is based on policy'01 and com-
mon usage, 0 7 whether it continues to apply to all offenses or
97. Statute of 7 William 4 and Statute of 1 Victoria, Chap. 85, § 11
(Lord Bennon's Act).
98. State v. Litzsimon, 18 R.I. 236, 27 A. 446 (1893).
99. See, e.g., Brandies v. State, 44 Al. App. 648, 219 So. 2d 404 (1968);
State v. Egland, 11 S.W.2d 1024 (Mo. 1928); Stapleman v. State, 150 Neb.
460, 34 N.W.2d 907 (1948); Perue v. State, 43 Wyo. 322, 2 P.2d 1072 (1931).
100. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Soudoni, 398 Pa. 546, 158 A.2d 687
(1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 886. See also, LEVIN, Sum. PA. JuR., CRIMI-
NAL LAW § 542 (1965) and 2 KESSLER, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
IN PENNSYLVANIA, 494 (1961).
101. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eberhardt, 164 Pa. Super. 591, 67 A.2d
613 (1949).
102. Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 97 A.2d 343 (1953).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 578.
105. Id.
106. Id.; Perue v. State, 43 Wyo. 322, 2 P.2d 1072 (1931).
107. Commonwealth v. Gable, 21 Pa. 423, 427 (1821).
merely to special offenses.l08
In summary, the defendant relying on his municipal convic-
tion or acquittal to form the foundation for a successful double
jeopardy plea when indicted for a more serious state crime must
realize that the common law rule, if in force, will prevent the mu-
nicipal offense from being a lesser included offense of a felony.10 9
If the common law rule remains in force only in respect to a par-
ticular crime, such as murder, the defendant's problem is lessened
since only municipal offenses related to that crime will be denied
the status of lesser included offenses. The defendant must also
realize that even if he can avoid the common law rule, he faces
the difficult task of fitting his municipal offense into one of the
definitions of a lesser included offense. Only occassionally do courts
apply liberal tests to the facts before them, 10 or give a broad in-
terpretation to the requirements of a usually narrow definition. 1'
These rare instances offer little comfort to the defendant search-
ing for a basis for a double jeopardy plea. The defendant who
has failed to show that the offenses are the "same" will find it
almost as difficult to show that the municipal prosecution was
for a lesser included offense of the offense being tried in the state
court.
III. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The last requirement for a successful plea of double jeopardy
is that the jurisdiction of the court trying the first charge be such
that jeopardy attached to the offense charged at the second
trial. Assuming that the defendant has been successful in estab-
lishing that his prior prosecution was for a lesser included offense,
his plea of double jeopardy can still fail if the jurisdiction of the
first tribunal did not extend to both offenses."' In other words,
prosecution for a lesser included offense will bar a prosecution
for the greater offense embracing it unless the first court lacked
jurisdiction over the greater offense. 113 The requirement that the
first tribunal have jurisdiction over both the greater offense and
its lesser included offenses is a particular problem to the defend-
ant whose first prosecution was in a municipal court. Since mu-
nicipal courts have limited jurisdiction, a prior municipal prose-
108. There are, however, some statutory provisions remaining which
allow special privileges to those accused of misdemeanors and creating spe-
cial exceptions to general procedure in the case of homicides. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 491 and § 833 (1936).
109. The common law rule does not prevent a municipal offense from
being a lesser included offense of a misdemeanor tried at the state level.
110. See, People v. Gassman, 95 Cal. App. 2d 293, 212 P.2d 585 (1949),
app. dism., 340 U.S. 801, reh. denied, 340 U.S. 916.
111. See, Commonwealth v. Thatcher, 364 Pa. 326, 71 A.2d 796 (1950).




cution will bar subsequent trials only in another municipal court11 4
or for a crime over which both the municipal court and a superior
court have jurisdiction. 115
The rule that a prosecution in a municipal court which lacked
jurisdiction over the greater offense is not a bar to a superior court
prosecution is based on the theory that jeopardy does not attach
to offenses beyond the jurisdiction of the court." 6  A municipal
court trial for aiding in the delinquency of a minor is not a bar to a
later state prosecution for statutory rape, arising from the same
act, since the defendant was not in jeopardy of being convicted of
statutory rape at the first trial because the municipal court lacked
jurisdiction in the rape charge.1 7 The rationale for the rule has
been criticized for not taking into account that a second convic-
tion for the lesser offense may result at the trial for the greater
offense.'1 " However, most courts have procedural rules which
prohibit the conviction of the lesser offense on the trial for the
greater. 1 9 A point which seems to have been overlooked is that
one of the reasons for the double jeopardy prohibition is the pre-
vention of continual prosecutions and harassment of the defend-
ant.120  If the guarantee against double jeopardy can be circum-
vented by simply allocating jurisdiction over a major offense to
one court and jurisdiction over its constituent parts to one or
more lesser courts, the opportunity for harassment is increased.
Although the defendant cannot be convicted a second time for the
lesser offense, he must still endure successive trials for one course
of conduct.
Although most jurisdictions follow the rule that lack of juris-
diction removes the bar to a second trial, an examination of the
cases reveals that the rule is seldom essential in the decision to
deny a double jeopardy plea.' 21 A great many cases which purport
to base the denial of a double jeopardy plea on a lack of jurisdic-
tion in the lower court are actually holding that the summary of-
fense is not a lesser included offense of the later charged of-
fense. 22 These courts have held that the first offense is only in-
114. Commonwealth v. Bergan, 134 Pa. Super. 62, 4 A.2d 164 (1939).
115. Diaz v. United States, 233 U.S. 442 (1911).
116. Id.; State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383, 106 N.E. 50 (1914).
117. State v. Barnette, 158 Me. 117, 179 A.2d 800 (1962).
118. A.L.I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY 137 (1935).
119. See, e.g., Bennett v. State, 229 Md. 208, 182 A.2d 815 (1962).
120. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
121. It should be noted that some states do not rely on case law for
this rule, but provide for it by statute. See, e.g., TAx. CODE CRIM. P oc. art.
28.13 (1965).
122. State v. Curry, 41 N.J. 531, 197 A.2d 678 (1964).
cidentally related to the greater offense and thus outside the scope
of double jeopardy. For example, violations of the motor vehicle
code are not considered crimes by some courts and cannot, there-
fore, be lesser included offenses of crimes. 123  There is no need
to decide the jurisdictional issue when it has already been de-
termined that the summary offense is not a lesser included of-
fense. Furthermore, some courts have used the jurisdictional rule
when the real reason for denying the plea seems to be that the
greater crime had not been committed at the time of the trial for
the lesser offense. This frequently occurs when the first trial is
for assault and battery and the victim subsequently dies, giving
rise to a homicide charge. 124 Lastly, the lack of jurisdiction has
been used as a reason for allowing a second trial even when there
was no first trial, in cases where the municipal proceeding was
merely a preliminary hearing which bound the defendant over
for state action.
1 25
It seems that policy reasons underlie the rule that a trial in a
municipal court will not bar the trial in a superior court for an of-
fense beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court. It is felt that
the rule prevents criminals from "escaping" a major punishment
by pleading guilty to a lesser included offense, thereby barring
trial on the more serious offense. The courts have also stressed
the gross disparity in the gravity of the offenses and the penal-
ties which may be imposed as evidence that prosecution for the
lesser offense should not bar trial for the greater offense when
the court lacks jurisdiction over the greater offense.
12
The defendant seeking the protection of double jeopardy will
have a greater chance of success in the few jurisdictions which
do not allow the jurisdiction of the court to affect the double
jeopardy rules. In these states prosecution for a lesser included
offense is a bar to a later prosecution for the greater crime re-
gardless of the jurisdiction of the first court.127  However, even in
these minority jurisdictions the decision to grant a plea of
double jeopardy is not based solely on the jurisdictional issue.
Some courts state the irrelevance of jurisdiction only after they
have already determined that the offenses are the same, usually
under a liberal identity test. 28  Other courts have relied on other
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 233 U.S. 442 (1911); Bacom v.
Sullivan, 200 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1952); State v. Simmons, 48 Del. 166, 99
A.2d 401 (1953).
125. Commonwealth v. Bergan, 134 Pa. Super. 62, 4 A.2d 164 (1939).
126. E.g., Bennett v. State, 229 Md. 208, 182 A.2d 815 (1962); State v.
Barnette, 158 Me. 117, 179 A.2d 800 (1962).
127. E.g., State v. Purdin, 207 Iowa 1058, 221 N.W. 562 (1928); State v.
Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951); People ex rel. Kwiatkawski v.
Trenkle, 169 Misc. 687, 9 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1938).
128. E.g., State v. Dixon, 40 N.J. 180, 191 A.2d 39 (1963). It should
be remembered that New Jersey uses both the same evidence and the
same transaction test. See note 50 supra.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
aspects of double jeopardy, such as collateral estoppel, in conjunc-
tion with the jurisdiction issue.129 The jurisdictions following the
minority rule defend their position by saying that the state has
elected which offense to try the defendant for, and should be
bound by that election. 3 0 This rationale ignores the practical
consideration that state officials are often unaware of the criminal
activity until after the municipal trial. The minority rule seems
to be based on policy considerations as much as the majority
rule. The minority states feel that their rule serves to inhibit
the harassment of the defendant by forbidding the splitting of his
offense into several lesser offenses and prosecuting him for each.
131
A survey of the decisions in both the majority and minority
jurisdictions indicates that whether or not the limited jurisdiction
of the municipal court affects the attaching of jeopardy depends
upon which policy reasons are followed.132 The question is sim-
ply which policy is more meritorious: one which seeks to insure
that those accused of crime do not "escape" with a light sentence
by barring the prosecution of a more serious charge with a plea
of double jeopardy; or one which aims at preventing harassment
of defendant with multiple trials arising out of the same incident.
There does seem to be validity in the claim made by some courts
following the minority view, that the problem of state officials
learning of the criminal activity after the municipal trial is merely
administrative.133 This problem could be corrected by closer co-
operation among levels of government or by legislative action,
without limiting the constitutional guarantee against double jeop-
ardy.
Nevertheless most states follow the rule that the trial for a
lesser included offense bars a trial for a greater offense only if
the lower court had jurisdiction over both offenses. Given the
limited jurisdiction of municipal courts, it becomes apparent that
only offenses which can be tried in either the municipal or state
courts will meet the jurisdictional requirement and provide a
proper instance for a plea of double jeopardy. 34 Unless the de-
129. E.g., People ex rel. Kwiatkawski v. Trenkle, 169 Misc. 687, 9
N.Y.S.2d 661 (1938).
130. See, e.g., State v. Purdin, 206 Iowa 1058, 221 N.W. 562 (1928).
131. Id. See also Twice in Jeopardy at 290.
132. For an example of the extent to which policy effects this area
compare State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 197 A.2d 678 (1964) with State v.
Berry, 41 N.J. 547, 197 A.2d 687 (1964), decided by the same court on
the same day with opposite results.
133. See, State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951).
134. Offenses which can be tried in both municipal and state courts
fendant is in a state which follows the minority rule an attempt
to plead a summary proceeding as a bar to later prosecution based
on double jeopardy will be frustrated by the limited jurisdiction
of the lower court.
CONCLUSION
The requirements for a successful plea of double jeopardy
are: the offense charged at the second trial must be the "same"
offense as was charged at the first trial, or alternatively, the of-
fense charged at the first trial must have been a lesser included
offense of the crime charged at the second trial; and, the jurisdic-
tion of the first tribunal must have extended to both offenses.
The defendant attempting to use his prior municipal prosecution
as a basis for a double jeopardy plea must meet these require-
ments. As the analysis of these requirements reveals, the defend-
ant's chances of success are minimal.
First, because the offenses tried in municipal courts are usu-
ally the product of legislative invention and are designed to deal
with a very specific course of conduct, it will be nearly impossi-
ble to establish the identity of the offenses. Under the same evi-
dence test, the defendant has little chance of showing that the
same evidence will prove a violation of two parts of an extensive
penal code. The same transaction test would provide the defend-
ant with a reasonable chance to succeed in his double jeopardy
plea if joinder of all offenses is required. However, the rule that
joinder of the offenses is not required if they are not all within
the jurisdiction of same the court places the defendant in a munic-
ipal trial outside the protection of the same transaction test.135
The interest-to-protect test could be the best identity test for all
concerned. The defendant could be reasonably successful in at-
tempting to prove that both offenses harmed the same interest
and the prosecution would not be required to join "unrelated"
offenses in one trial. Unfortunately, the limited acceptance of the
interest-to-protect test and its rather vague guidelines make it of
little use at present.
Secondly, because the determination of what is a lesser in-
cluded offense is based on arbitrary tests rather than on the logi-
include assault and battery and disorderly conduct. It is interesting to
note that these offenses are also the ones which qualify as the same of-
fense under any identity test and which qualify as lesser included of-
fenses under most definitions. In essence, they are the only summary
offenses which will bar a subsequent superior court prosecution.
135. The jurisdictional problem does not present a problem to the
other identity tests because once identity of offenses is established there is
no need to look to lesser included offenses and the jurisdictional problem
only applies to lesser included offenses not to "same" offenses. However,
under the same transaction test the jurisdiction of the court is an essen-
tial factor in determining whether the offenses are the same.
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cal relationship of one offense to another, a summary offense will
seldom qualify as a lesser included offense of a greater offense.
Once again the specialized nature of summary offenses will pre-
vent them from meeting a requirement for a successful plea of
double jeopardy. Seldom will all the elements of a summary
offense fall within the definition of a greater offense. Further-
more in jurisdictions still adhering to the common law rule, the
prohibition of the joinder of misdemeanors and felonies on the
same indictment will prevent summary offenses from being lesser
included offenses of felonies.
If the defendant can show that he was previously prosecuted
for the "same offense," he has established double jeopardy and
need not worry about the other requirements. If he fails to prove
identity, he must seek to show that he was previously prosecuted
for a lesser included offense. If he cannot prove that he was
prosecuted for a lesser included offense his plea will fail and he
is defeated. However, if he can prove prosecution for a lesser in-
cluded offense he must still prove that the municipal court had
jurisdiction over both the lesser offense and the greater. If he
fails his plea also fails. Since municipal courts have very limited
jurisdiction, the defendant will rarely be able to meet this re-
quirement. Therefore, except for an offense which has the same
name at the municipal and state levels, or which is merely a lesser
degree of a greater crime, and over which both municipal and
state courts have jurisdiction, a trial for a summary offense will
not supply the foundation for a successful plea of double jeopar-
dy.13 6 Waller v. Florida3 7 does stand for the proposition that a
municipal trial will bar a subsequent state trial, but only if all
the requirements for pleading double jeopardy are met.
T. R. BOSSERT
136. See note 134 supra.
137. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
